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Abstract
Migration has strongly manifested itself to historic highs, creating divisive views among politicians, policy
makers and individuals. The present paper studies the Europeans’ attitudes toward immigration and the
contextual factors that shape these attitudes. Based on 267,282 respondents from 22 countries and over
the period 2002-2014, we find that despite the eventful past years, Europeans, on average, are still posi-
tive toward immigrants with the North European countries to be the most xenophile to immigrants of all
backgrounds. High educational level and political orientation (right-wing) are among the most important
individual characteristics that associate with xenophile and xenophobic sentiments, respectively. Macroe-
conomic conditions and ethnic diverse environments play a very important role in shaping public attitudes.
A salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the impact of other contextual factors, individuals (and
countries) with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes toward immigration than the rest of
the population (countries). Social capital further moderates the negative effects of any "perceived threat"
on people’s opinions about immigrants.
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1. Introduction
Migration has strongly manifested itself to historic highs.1 Spurred by civil war, political instability
and the global financial crisis, constantly growing immigration flows to European countries and between
European countries posed certain challenges for host countries and rose concerns about the potential costs
of welcoming more immigrants on employment, welfare benefits, security and social cohesion.
Two concurring factors have arguably contributed to bringing migration to the centre of public atten-
tion. First, the aftermath of dramatic economic recession, from which some European countries are still
struggling to recover, left European countries fragile with weaker economic prospects and generalised cuts
to public spending, led voters to question the legitimacy of foreign nationals’ presence in their countries.
When opportunities shrink fears of potential competition for access to the labour market and to the welfare
state intensify. Second, the Syrian exodus and the number of people that have arrived in Europe in the
IWe are grateful to George Bouloucheris for excellent research assistance. We also thank Kyriakos Drivas, Sotiris Karkalakos and
Dimitris Konstantios and seminar and conference participants at the Economics Department Seminar Series for useful insights. The
usual disclaimer applies.
∗Corresponding author.
Email addresses: economidou@unipi.gr (Claire Economidou), karamanis@unipi.gr (Dimitris Karamanis),
kechrinioti@unipi.gr (Alexandra Kechrinioti), xesfingi@unipi.gr (Sofia Xesfingi)
1Migration Policy Institute (MPI) data show that the total annual asylum applications in the EU Member States and European
Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries from 2008 to 2015 have increased by 444% - from 256,155 to 1,393,285 applications. Only
in 2015 there were 3.8 millions of new immigrants in the EU; half of them originating from non-member countries. In 2008, most of
asylum applications came from immigrants from Iraq (12.58%), Russia (8.71%), Somalia (7.57%); in 2015, 27.54% of applicants were
from Syria; India, China, Morocco, Pakistan and Ukraine are top origin countries of newly arrived non-EU citizens during the period
of 2010-2013.
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last few years to seek asylum having fled conflicts and oppression in Asia and Africa has reached histori-
cal highs. The absence of EU-level coordinated mechanisms to respond to the emergency (for instance, to
effectively allocate refugees across member countries and spread the economic burden of hosting them),
led many member countries to autonomous and uncoordinated responses, with national political concerns
and hostile feelings to be on the rise among the general public.
Immigration is also highly politicised. It has been a divisive issue in many countries as the right-wing
parties brought the issue to front lines in their election campaigns, which usually drew attention on the
economic burden of immigration and also on cultural distinctiveness of the immigrant groups to argue for
more exclusionist immigration policies. Immigration took, for instance, centre stage in the campaign that
led to the vote for the ’Brexit’ of the UK from the European Union in June 2016. It has also been debated
in many other European countries (Austria, Hungary, Netherlands). In addition, terrorist attacks in France
and Belgium perpetuated by second-generation immigrants triggered a harsh debate that questioned the
idea of integration of foreign nationals in hosting societies. Immigration -undocumented migration, in
particular- has also been a divisive issue in the US political debate. The constant presence of immigration
in the media, however, does not necessarily mean that the discussion and the public understanding of the
subject matter have become progressively deeper and better documented.
Yet, while the economic recession -along with the absence of a supranational, EU-level coordinated
approach to immigration- seemed to have provided a justification for political pandering to a surge of
anti-immigrant sentiment, it is far from clear how much public opinion has really shifted in that direction.
This paper studies what shapes Europeans’ sentiments toward immigration. We carefully combine
individual survey data and aggregate data to analyse the factors and conditions that contribute to cross-
country attitude variation toward immigration, and explore the relevance of theories in explaining the
formation of these attitudes.
Our work relates to an insightful body of research on public sentiments on immigration that has devel-
oped in recent years since ?’s (?) seminal cross-national work.2 Researchers have explored whether oppo-
sition to immigrants is due primarily to perceived economic threat, cultural threat, or to some combination
of the two. Economic arguments test predictions of models of labour market competition and immigrants’
use of public services (?Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Studies, emphasising cultural elements, focus on
threats to national identity and racist (???Jolly and DiGiusto, 2014; Kaufmann and Harris, 2015), religion
(?), values and beliefs (Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), ethnic differences, (Brader et al., 2008),
language difference (Hopkins, 2011), conservative social attitudes (Ford, 2011), personal traits and predis-
position (Dinesen et al., 2016). Other studies highlight the effect of security fears (??) and concerns about
crime (?Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Last but not least, studies have examined whether direct or representative
democracy favours fair treatment of immigrant minorities (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2015).3
Our paper adds to the literature in two distinct ways: First, we provide a comprehensive analysis of
the micro level characteristics that shape immigration sentiments. The vast majority of research on public
attitudes to immigration has followed a piecemeal approach, as it focused on few characteristics of the in-
dividual, mainly socio-demographic (i.e., gender, age, income, employment status, among others). We use
the recent edition of the European Social Survey (ESS) database to estimate models at the individual level
which include the commonly used individual characteristics along with other, less explored, characteris-
tics such as trust, networks, norms and sanctions -the so-called social capital. The latter is consider to be
the "glue" for more cooperative communities (?), with better community governance (Bowles and Gintis,
2002) and economic growth (?). In the increasingly multicultural societies if sound social capital generates
more integrated societies, it should be relevant for the issue of immigration. The evidence, however, in the
empirical literature on public attitude and social capital is scant. To our knowledge, there is a single study
by Herreros and Criado (2009) that employs only one dimension of social capital, "trust in people" draw-
ing only on the 2002-2003 ESS data and for sixteen European countries. The authors find that regardless
2The pioneering empirical study of Quillian examined the impact of macroeconomic circumstances on attitudes to immigrants in
Europe and regressed a measure on prejudice against immigrants on the inverse of GDP per capita across twelve European countries
that were observed in 1988.
3For a review of theories proposed to explain immigration sentiments, see the work of Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014).
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of the impact of other individual-level variables and contextual variables such as levels of unemployment
or percentage of foreign population, individuals with high trust exhibit more positive attitudes towards
immigration than the rest of the population. We, additionally, explore more aspects of social capital, along
with other contextual factors, and for many ESS waves and countries.
Second, we enrich the micro data with macro level data to capture the economic conditions and mul-
ticultural environments. We consider a range of macroeconomic variables to proxy the economic perfor-
mance of a country as well as its ethnic diversity. The inclusion of the economic and multicultural profile of
a country allows us to obtain more insights and discuss competing theories. Specifically, the literature on
public opinion on immigration has analysed various versions of two main hypotheses: the "threat hypothe-
sis" and the "contact hypothesis". The threat hypothesis considers that racial prejudices toward immigrants
are a response to a perceived threat to the economic and political privileges of the dominant ethnic group
in a society. These perceived threats can result from, among others, the relative size of the subordinate
group (Blalock, 1967), country’s economic circumstances (?) or personal economic circumstances (?).4 The
"contact hypothesis", in contrast, considers that the presence of large populations of out-groups provides
members of the dominant group with first-hand experience of different people, which, under certain condi-
tions, can diminish racial prejudices (?). Unfavourable macroeconomic circumstances and strong presence
of foreign population in a country can create concerns of potential competition for access to the labour
market and to the welfare state and lead to more prejudice and racism toward immigrants. Therefore, it is
interesting to explore whether the presence of social capital can mitigate these typical "threat" conditions
and lead to more positive sentiments toward immigration.
Our empirical analysis covers 22 countries for a total of 267,282 individuals over the period 2002-2014
and develops around two main questions: (i) What explains Europeans’ xeno-phile(/phobic) attitudes
toward immigration? and (ii) Do Europeans’ attitudes vary across different immigrant profiles?
Despite the economic upheavals, we find Europeans, on average, to be rather positive toward immi-
grants with the North European countries to exhibit less xenophobic attitudes. Among the personal char-
acteristics of the individual, the level of education shapes xenophile sentiments, while right-wing political
orientation forms more xenophobic stances. Macroeconomic conditions as well as ethnic diversity play
an important role in shaping attitudes. However, a salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the
impact of other contextual factors, individuals (and countries) with high social capital do exhibit more pos-
itive attitudes toward all immigrants -independently of their background- than the rest of the population
(countries). Furthermore, social capital moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people’s
opinions about immigrants.
This could be important for the increasingly multicultural societies we live in. Improving the efficiency
of the institutions (legal, health and education systems) increases the trust to the government and society
in general and associates with positive sentiments to immigration. Instead of cultivating differentiation,
fragmentation and exclusion, successful public policies should aim at investing in social capital. Policies
that foster the bonding, bridging and linking of different communities and between communities and
public agents, increase country’s social cohesion and prosperity.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the framework for modelling
individuals’ attitudes to immigration and the estimation technique. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4
presents the results. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes.
4For a long time, prejudice was only explained through individual characteristics or social psychological theories based on inter-
group relations (Jackson, 1993; ?). Blumer (1958) extended the existing framework by recognising the importance of the group per-
spective. While originally developed in the context of US race relations, group threat theory is general in its formulations of in-versus
out-groups and it has been applied as the theoretical motivation of empirical investigations of European natives’ attitudes towards
immigrants or immigration.
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2. A Framework of Analysis
2.1. Modelling Individual’s Attitudes towards Immigration
Suppose that stated immigration concerns depend on latent continuous concerns about immigration. If
y∗ denotes latent concerns and y the stated concerns, then holds,
y∗it = x
Tβ+ eit (1)
where i and t denote country and time; x is a vector of covariates; and β is the vector of regression
coefficients to be estimated.
Further, suppose that while we cannot observe y∗, we can instead observe the categories of response:
y =

0, if y∗ ≤ c1,
1, if c1 < y∗ ≤ c2,
2, if c2 < y∗ ≤ c3,
.
.
N, if cN < y∗
(2)
To capture the complex and multifaceted nature of sentiments towards immigration, we consider in-
terviewees’ responses (y∗) in six different statements: (i) "immigration is bad or good for country’s econ-
omy", (ii) "country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants", (iii) "immigrants make country
worse or better place to live", (iv) "allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority",
(v) "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority", and (vi) "allow many/few
immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe". While the first three statements capture the effects of
immigration on economic, cultural and welfare prospects of the host country, the last three explore indi-
vidual attitudes towards different immigrant profiles.
The vector x is a set of covariates that includes Sociodemographic, Social Capital, Macroeconomic and
Foreign variables. More analytically, the set of Sociodemographic contains characteristics of the individ-
ual, namely gender, age, education, marital status, health status, net income, domicile, employment status,
religiousness, political orientation, and the origin (family roots) of the interviewee. The literature in sociol-
ogy has identified some of these characteristics as import ones in shaping attitudes (?Billiet, 1995; Coenders
and Scheepers, 2003; ?; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Arguably, one would expect that older, low-income,
low-educated, unemployed and extreme right in political orientation individuals, for example, would ex-
press more xenophobic opinions about immigration. This set of variables has been commonly used in all
micro level analyses with evidence, on their statistical importance, to vary across studies.
Next set of variables, is what the literature calls social capital, i.e., the stock of social relations, based
on norms and networks of cooperation and trust in intra- and inter-groups that spillover to the market
and state to enhance collective action between formal actors and achieve social efficiency and growth.
The Social Capital set includes three dimensions, as proposed by Coleman (1988): (i) trust in people and
institutions -interpersonal trust creates bonds between people, influences individual outcomes as well as
social group interactions, facilitates cooperation, efficiency and trust in the quality of the political, legal and
institutional environment (?), thus increasing society overall effectiveness (??); (ii) interpersonal networks
such as meeting colleagues, friends or family lead to a greater social embeddedness of the individual and
to a strong feeling of belonging in society and thus enhance trust and cooperation;5 and (iii) norms and
effective sanctions -solid norms and transparent and effective sanctions reduce the incentives for criminal
5Networks can be further subdivided into informal, Putnam-type social activities, yielding positive externalities (informally meet-
ing with friends, relatives, colleagues, but also participating in associations such as churches, voluntary work), and formal, Olson-type
special interest group engagement such as work for political parties, professional organisations or trade unions, which may yield neg-
ative externalities in a society.
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action; individuals who do not feel afraid but feel safe in the surroundings they live in, develop stronger
ties within their community. One would expect that in societies where trust in people and institutions
is high, networks work to society’s benefit and solid norms and effect sanctions are present, then these
societies show more receptive attitudes to multiculturalism and ethnic diversity and to new comers (new
immigrants). Even in a "threat context", for instance, when some individuals are in a "risky" situation (being
unemployed or close to job loss) or in times of economic upheavals, where usually people feel threaten of
losing their economic or political privileges, the presence of rich capital stock in a society mitigates such
threats. A society characterised by high levels of social capital could achieve the integration of immigrants
more easily than a society with lower levels of social trust. Empirical evidence by Herreros and Criado
(2009) corroborates to the important role of trust in shaping positive attitudes toward immigration. As
Herreros and Criado (2009) have shown, social trust may have a direct effect, social trusters have positive
sentiments toward immigrants and an indirect, even in difficult situations (threat context) social trusters
are more receptive to immigrants than social distrusters.
The set Macroeconomic includes variables that characterise the economic environment of a country that
could also affect public assessments. Arguably, public attitudes toward immigrants become more positive
in good economic times and more negative in economic downturns. For example, when the aggregate
production shrinks, so do the opportunities; fears of potential job loss and competition for access to the
labour market and to the welfare state intensify. The fiscal cost of immigration becomes more of an is-
sue of concern at economic downturns and raises concerns among individuals, which are either at the
bottom of the income distribution and thus are threatened of immigrant competition for a fixed supply
of welfare benefits or further up of the income distribution and therefore worry about the potential tax
implications of immigration-induced expansion of the welfare budget. According to the threat theory, an
economic downturn should imply more negative attitudes towards minority groups and also among ma-
jority group members who do not personally feel threatened. We consider a number of variables that relate
to macroeconomic environment, namely gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, unemployment, central
government dept, social benefits, Gini coefficient that are good proxies of economic welfare, fiscal burden
and (in)equality, respectively, of the host country. Empirical evidence, however, is mixed, mainly weak and
sometimes with perverse results (??????). We also consider the share of elderly people in a country, as ris-
ing old-age dependency ratios pose a challenge to the viability of public pension and health systems. The
loosening of immigration policies is often seen as one policy option to counter this challenge.6 The share
of elderly people in a country enters in our model as a dummy that gets the value one if a country has high
elder citizens share and zero otherwise, to test whether sentiments toward immigration differ across coun-
tries with different age distributions. Empirical evidence (Calahorrano, 2013) supports that over the life
cycle stated immigration concerns are predicted to increase well into retirement and decrease afterwards.
The set Foreign contains a number of variables relevant to the multicultural and ethnic diversity of
the host country. The presence of foreigners in a country, such as stock of foreign (i.e., foreign-born, first
and second generation of immigrants) population, asylum seekers, number of nationality acquisitions and
country’s colonial tradition may shape attitudes as well.7 According to a simplified version of contact the-
ory (Allport, 1954), increased contact with immigrants should undermine xenophobic sentiment. For ex-
ample, people who live next to well-integrated neighbours tend to have positive immigration sentiments
(Ha, 2010). In contrast, threat theory argues that inter-group contact intensifies conflict due to competi-
tion over scarce resources (Blumer, 1958; Blalock, 1967). From this perspective, in countries with larger
immigrant populations, there is more of a perceived group threat, leading to more antipathy toward the
out-group (Hjerm, 2009). Empirical evidence is also mixed as to the effect of the presence of foreigners to in-
dividuals’ perceptions toward immigration depending on the theory/mechanism at work. For example, ?
6Studies have shown that even modest increases in immigration can have positive fiscal impacts, especially if immigrants are
selected according to age and skill (?Bonin et al., 2000).
7Colonial tradition influences migration patterns between former imperial powers and their colonies of the past. Clear examples
are the cases of old colonial countries such as the UK and France and immigrant nations like the US, where many earlier immigrants
have now become citizens or are second or third generation "immigrants"; nevertheless, they are often still perceived as a minority out-
group. Failure of policies intended to aid in the integration of new comers into the host society frustrates local people, exacerbating
anti-immigrant attitudes among the public.
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find that between regions, a larger size of the immigrant population increases negative reactions but within
regions, more immigrants increase inter-group contact and reduce immigrant derogation. In similar vein,
? find regions with a higher percentage of immigrants born outside the EU and a higher unemployment
rate among the immigrant population to show a higher probability natives to express negative attitudes to
immigration. However, ? finds that the size of the immigrant population has no impact on attitudes at all.
Colonial tradition enters in our model as a dummy that gets the value one if country has colonial history
and zero otherwise and intends to capture whether sentiments to immigration differ between countries
with colonial history (and potentially richer and more accustomed to ethnic diversities) and countries with
no such history (Gallaher et al., 2009).
Our aim is to assess the impact of each one of the aforementioned variables on shaping Europeans’
sentiments toward immigration. Of particularly special interest are the variables in the set Social Capital,
as there is scant empirical evidence on how they influence public attitudes toward immigration. One
way to examine their impact is to include them directly into the model. To also test competing theories, for
instance, "contact" versus "threat", we interact social capital variables with some of the traditionally "threat"
variables, such as employment status (unemployed) and various multiculturalism variables (from the set
Foreign). Our main hypothesis is that social capital has a positive direct effect on attitudes, and an indirect
effect via mitigating the influence of the impact of the "threat" factors on attitude formation.
2.2. Estimation Strategy
Our dependent variable, attitude of the individuals toward immigration, is ordinal; that is, we can rank
the values, but the real distance between categories is unknown. Respondents state that immigration is
"bad for a country’s economy" if their latent concern exceeds a higher threshold c1, "good for a country’s
economy" if their latent concern exceeds a much higher threshold, c2 and "very good for a country’s econ-
omy" if their latent concern exceeds an even higher threshold, c3.8 The vector parameter β and c= (c1, c2,
c3)’ can then be chosen such as to maximize the likelihood of observing the sample on hand. This requires
an assumption on the distribution of e. Assuming a standard normal distribution function, results in the
ordered probit model, whereas assuming a standard logistic distribution function, results in the ordered
logit model. Testing the distribution of the error term, we employ ordered logistic regression model, as de-
scribed in the section above, in which the estimated set of regression coefficients (β), predict the probability
of the outcome of interest (for example, immigration is very good). We estimate our ordered logit using
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) techniques.
Analysing together micro (survey) and macro level data could raise some issues, as the latter vary
mainly across countries and not necessarily within a country especially in short spans. The common
practice in the public opinion literature is to regress a measure of attitude on some macro variables, for
instance GDP per capita or unemployment rates along with other contextual micro level data in a cross
section of countries. The results reported in this literature include statistically significant coefficients with
the expected as well as with the unexpected signs. Instead, in this study, we transform all macroeco-
nomic (Macroeconomic) and multiculturalism related (Foreign) variables into dummies (high versus low)
and "cut-off" our data using sample medians. In this way, we focus mainly on the impact of micro level
variables on attitudes, meanwhile controlling for the influence of the macroeconomic and multicultural
environment.
Before embarking to empirically estimating the role of various factors in shaping individual’s stance
on immigration, one may encounter some issues to properly comparing opinions expressed across differ-
ent survey rounds (strata) within same country as well as across different countries. In principal, cross-
stratum/country analysis should be conducted using weights. The European Study Survey (ESS) pro-
vides three types of weights: design (DWEIGHT), post-stratification (PSPWGHT), and population size
(PWEIGHT) weights.9 The main purpose of the design weights is to correct for possible sample selection
8Immigration is considered "very bad for a country’s economy" if individuals’ latent concern is below threshold c1.
9A detailed discussion on weights is available at https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/ESS_weighting_data_1.pdf.
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bias as in some countries respondents have different probabilities to be part of the sample due to the sam-
pling design used. Post-stratification weights are a more sophisticated weighting strategy that uses auxil-
iary information (on age-group, gender, education, and region) to reduce the sampling error and potential
non-response bias. Population size weights correct for the different population sizes of the countries par-
ticipating in the survey so that each country is represented in proportion to its population size; otherwise,
as country samples are similar in size, cross-country estimates may be biased, over-representing smaller
countries at the expense of larger ones.
We take these weighting schemes into account and adjust our data using post-stratification (PSPWGHT)
and population size (PWEIGHT) weights to control for qualitative characteristics of the interviewees in
each wave within a country and for different country sizes, respectively.
3. Data Description and Analysis
Our empirical analysis covers 22 countries for the period 2002 to 2014 and a total of 267,282 individuals.
The main source of our data is the European Social Survey (ESS), a large-scale biennial study of attitudes
and values, consisting of seven rounds/waves that date back to 2002.10 Regarding data availability, some
countries in the dataset are represented with observations from all ESS waves, while others only for some
waves. Table ?? in the Appendix presents the participating countries (as well as their 3-letter abbreviation
code) and the number of observations per country in each wave.
The dependent variable (y) is a vector and contains individuals’ responses on six statements about
immigration: (i) "immigration is bad or good for country’s economy" (Economy), (ii) "country’s cultural life
undermined or enriched by immigrants" (Culture), (iii) "immigrants make country worse or better place to
live" (Place to Live), (iv) "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (Same Race),
(v) "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority" (Di f f erent Race), and (vi)
"allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe" (Poorer/NonEU). The answers are
ordinal and limited. For the first three statements, the respondents were shown a card with a 10-point
scale, where only the two most distant points were articulated (i.e., 0-bad for the economy and 10-good
for the economy; 0-Cultural life undermined and 10-Cultural life enriched; 0-Worse place to live and 10-
Better place to live, respectively), while for the last three statements the interviewees had to choose among
four points (1-Allow many, 2-Allow some, 3-Allow a few, 4-Allow none). We reduced the 10-point scale
of the three first variables (Economy, Culture, and Place to Live) to a 4-point scale based on the quantile
distribution of the answers provided. In this way, we have less classes and all six dependent variables are
expressed to a 4-point scale. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the correspondence between ESS coding and
ours.
Figure 1, below, maps Europe according to the responses of the Europeans on the statements: "immigra-
tion is bad or good for country’s economy" (left map), "country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by
immigrants" (middle map), and "immigrants make country worse or better place to live" (right map), over
our whole period, 2002-2014. Bold blue indicates positive individuals’ sentiments toward immigration,
while light blue indicates the opposite.
10The data were gathered in face-to-face interviews conducted in the native language of the interviewee. All rounds together
contain micro data for almost 336,964 individuals. Data are available at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org).
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Figure 1: European Attitudes toward Immigration
Figure 2 maps the attitude of the Europeans toward immigration policy statements: "allow many/few
immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (left map), "allow many/few immigrants of different
race /ethnic group from majority" (middle map), and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries
outside Europe" (right map).
Figure 2: European Attitudes toward Immigration Policy
Two things are worth noting: First, a consistent finding that emerges is that there is no significant vari-
ability in the answers of the interviewees across the different statements about immigration. Throughout
the sample period, Switzerland, Sweden and Norway consistently show more xenophile attitude toward
immigration and to all immigrant profiles, while Greece, Czech Republic and Hungary appear to be more
xenophobic. The composition of individuals’ sentiments per country and over our sample period is por-
trayed in Figure ?? and Figure ?? in the Appendix.
It is interesting to explore whether Europeans’ attitudes change over time. As the economic effects of
immigration have been an issue of upmost importance that have been strongly debated in the media, Table
1, below, depicts the evolution of the attitudes toward "immigration is bad or good for country’s economy"
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across countries and for three waves, wave 2002-2004 (beginning of the survey), wave 2006-2008 (beginning
of financial crisis) and wave 2012-2014 (large inflows of immigrants - Syrian Exodus).
Table 1: Country Trends toward Immigration
("Immigration is Bad/Good for a Country’s Economy")
Wave 2002-2004 Wave 2006-2008 Wave 2012-2014
Austria 2.89 — 2.61
Belgium 2.47 2.55 2.42
Czech Republic 2.44 2.31 2.13
Denmark 2.54 2.72 2.56
Estonia — 2.47 2.64
Finland 2.73 2.80 2.71
France 2.72 2.57 2.45
Germany 2.70 2.70 2.89
Greece 2.14 2.04 —
Hungary 2.33 2.08 2.12
Ireland 2.63 2.60 2.64
Italy 2.79 — —
Netherlands 2.61 2.76 2.56
Norway 2.79 2.84 2.84
Poland 2.49 2.83 2.61
Portugal 2.55 2.66 2.67
Slovak Republic — 2.41 —
Slovenia 2.41 2.39 2.31
Spain 2.79 2.73 2.65
Sweden 2.84 2.84 2.89
Switzerland 2.97 3.06 3.05
United Kingdom 2.44 2.53 2.59
sample mean 2.63 2.63 2.63
"Immigration is bad or good for country’s economy". Respondents choose
among points: 1=Very bad, 2=Bad, 3=Good, 4=Very good.
Based on Table 1, three things are worth noting: First, Europeans are reasonably in favour of immigrants
with an average score of 2.63 out of 4 possible points. About half of the European countries in each wave
have rather positive (above sample mean) score implying that both the financial crisis and the large influx
of immigrants -especially observed after 2013- did not dramatically alter the attitude of the Europeans.
Second, a consistent finding that also emerges is that countries that were rather positive to immigration
at the beginning of the ESS survey have remained positive throughout, while others with rather negative
(below sample mean) stance to immigration have remained negative across rounds and over time. Among
them, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries (except Denmark) appear to be more welcoming to im-
migration inflows and this attitude is consistent and even growing over time/waves. In contrast, countries
such as Greece, Hungary and Czech Republic show a more "xenophobic" attitude with an even increasing
trend over time/waves.
Third, countries that traditionally have been receptive to immigrants such as Germany, the Scandina-
vian countries, the UK and France show completely different attitude trends over time. Germany and
the Scandinavian countries have remained pretty stable over time (with increase of positive sentiments
in Germany), while France and the UK show a declining trend with the UK to rank below sample mean.
Southern countries, which were all hit hard by the financial crisis, exhibit a mixed picture: Spain and Por-
tugal show a rather positive but declining view over immigration, while Greece remains steadily negative.
It would be interesting to follow the development of Greece’s and Italy’s scores for the wave 2012-2014,
as both countries have been "gates" to Europe for thousands of immigrants - mainly refugees from Syria.
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Unfortunately, we lack information for Greece for the last wave (wave 2012-2014). Greece’s score, however,
on the earlier round, wave 2010-2012, is 2.08; our guess is that this negative attitude will continue in the
next survey round and get even worse due to the closed border policy. Similarly, there is no information
about Italy for the wave 2006-2008 and wave 2012-2014; there is, however, for the wave 2010-2012, which is
2.72 -rather positive (above the sample mean) and quite stable over time. Finally, similar rankings emerge
when interviewees comment on the rest of the depended variables, i.e., "country’s cultural life undermined
or enriched by immigrants", "immigrants make country worse or better place to live", "allow many/few
immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority", "allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic
group from majority", and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe".
Figure 3, below, visualises the trends of sentiments toward immigration’s effects on a country’s econ-
omy. We plot attitude scores of various groups of countries: with the most positive attitude (Switzerland
and Sweden), with the most negative attitude (Greece and Hungary), and for large receptive countries
(Germany, France, and the UK).
Figure 3: Trends of European Attitudes toward Immigration
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Immigration bad or good for country's economy
From Figure 3 one can clearly see that despite the challenges Europe has been through, "friendly" to
immigration countries and large receptive countries have not altered their immigration attitude over time.
In contrast, the attitude of the least xenophile countries exhibits big fluctuation with a strong declining
tendency for Greece. For the latter, there is a sharp pick around the year 2004 -as Greece hosted the Olympic
Games that year- and a sharp decline thereafter, as the economic conditions deteriorated ("Greek crisis").
Unfortunately, the ESS survey does not provide information for Greece for the period 2012-2014.
Next, a number of regressors are included in the vector set, x. Information on the socio-demographic
variables, i.e., gender (Gender), age (Age), education level (Education level), marital status (Marital status),
health status (Health status), net income level (Income level), domicile (Domicile), employment status (Employ
ment status), religiousness (Religiousness), political orientation (Political orientation), and whether one of
the parents was immigrant (Immigrant parents) is also derived from the ESS database. In almost all afore-
mentioned variables, we "merged" the range of a respondent’s categories just to reduce the number of
classes. Table A.2 in the Appendix shows the correspondence between ESS coding and ours.
10
Data on different dimensions of social capital, trust in people (Trust People) and in institutions (Trust Legal
System, State o f health services, State o f Education system), networks (Social interaction, Church attendance,
Worked in political/action group, Contacted politician/government, Worn campaign badge/sticker, Take part
in demonstrations, and Member o f trade union) and norms and effective sanctions (Feel sa f e, Feel f air treated
and Victim o f burglary/assault) are retrieved from the ESS as well. In similar vein, as with the sociode-
mographic variables, we modified the ESS range of interviewees’ responses. Table A.2 in the Appendix
provides the correspondence between ESS coding and ours.
Data on macroeconomic variables, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (constant 2011 thousand
dollars, PPP) (GDPcap) and central government dept ratio to GDP (Debt/GDP) come from the World Bank,
World Development Indicators database.11 Elderly people share to country’s population (DHighElderlyPop)
comes from the CIA Factbook database and is a dummy that takes the value of one if a country’s elderly
population share is above sample’s median, and zero otherwise.
The set Foreign, includes variables relevant to the multicultural profile of a country, namely percent-
age of foreigners (foreign-born, first and second generation) to country’s population, percentage of asylum
seekers to country’s population and percentage of nationality acquisitions to country’s population -all de-
rived from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). All these variables en-
ter in our model as dummies that take the value of one, if percentage of foreigners to country’s population
(DHighForeignStock), percentage of asylum seekers to country’s population (DHighAsylumSeekers), percentage of
nationality acquisitions to country’s population (DHighNationalityAcq) are above sample’s median, and zero
otherwise. Information on the colonial tradition of a country is extracted from Gallaher et al. (2009) and
is a dummy (DColonial tradition) that takes the value of one if a country has been a coloniser -even once in its
history, and zero otherwise.
Figure 4 associates standards of living -proxied by GDP per capita (y-axis), sentiments toward immi-
gration’s effects on a country’s economy (x-axis) and size of foreigners to population in the host country
(bubble’s size equals to the size of foreigners to population):
Figure 4: Sentiments toward Immigration, Standards of Living and Size of Foreigners (%)
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11We aimed to include more macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rate, social benefits (%GDP) and the Gini coefficient
for income inequality, but collinearity among variables was significant.
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Countries with high standards of living, also tend to have more positive attitude toward immigration.
Among these countries, Switzerland singles out as it has the largest share of foreign population (size of
bubble), the largest GDP per capita and the least opposition to immigration. Germany, Ireland Austria and
Spain are also countries which host large number of foreigners and tend to be positive, while Belgium,
France, and the UK although they have significant number of foreigns in their population are rather con-
servatively positive. On the other side of the spectrum, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, and Czech Republic are
countries with lower GDP per capita and higher anti-immigration sentiments compared to the rest. Within
this group, Greece is more multicultural as 5.7% of its population are foreigners (period average), while
Czech Republic and especially Hungary are more homogenous with 3.6% and 1.5% of the their population,
respectively, to be foreigners. These two conditions, being less wealthy and with ethnically diverse back-
ground, can generate negative sentiments to immigrants. As recourses are few and competition (for jobs
and benefits) is intense, immigrants just add more pressure to the system, which eventually translates into
more xenophobic reactions towards new comers.
Differences in economic standards of living and presence of foreigners can explain some of the attitude
variation across countries. For example, Sweden and Greece have similar presence of foreigners in their
population (6.2% and 5.7%, respectively), but Sweden’s GDP per capita is 1.5 times bigger than that of
Greece. What is striking, however, is that Swedish people show about two times more trustworthiness to
each other and to their institutions than the Greeks. Greece also has the lowest score in trust, among the
least immigrant-friendly countries, and also the lowest in the entire sample.
Figure 5, below, associates social capital -proxied by trust in people (y-axis), sentiments toward immi-
gration’s effects on a country’s economy (x-axis) and size of foreigners to population in the host country
(bubble’s size equals to the size of foreigners over population):
Figure 5: Sentiments toward Immigration, Social Trust and Size of Foreigners (%)
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Summary statistics for all variables across all countries in our sample and for the period 2002-2014 are
reported in Table ?? in the Appendix. On average, Europeans have a rather positive stance to immigration
and different immigrant profiles, as the scores of the six depend variables indicate. They tend to welcome
more immigrants of the same/race and less immigrants from poorer non-European countries. Cultural
cohesion seems to be more of a concern than economic or life quality impacts of immigration. Commending
on some of the characteristics of the individuals in our sample, we can say that on average Europeans are
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more social trusters than distrusters in others and their institutions, socialise often, are not much of church-
goers, the majority have not worked in political or action groups, or contacted politicians and government
officers, or displayed campaign budge, or participated in public demonstrations, or have been member of
trade unions, but feel rather safe, fairly treated, and have not often fallen victims of burglary/assault over
the last 5 years. Finally, on average, 10% of the population of a European country applied for asylum, 19%
have acquired the nationality of the country, about 6.6% are foreigners (immigrants) and almost half of the
countries have been colonisers some period in their history with at least one colony.
4. Empirical Results
This section presents our results. First, we examine what factors shape Europeans’ sentiments toward
immigrants, and second, whether these sentiments vary across different immigrant profiles.
4.1. What Explains Europeans’ Xeno-phile(/phobic) Attitudes toward Immigrants?
Table 2 shows the results. Columns (i) to (iii) report odd estimates of equation (1) on the interviewees’
attitudes toward "immigration is bad or good for country’s economy" (Economy), "country’s cultural life
undermined or enriched by immigrants" (Culture), and "immigrants make country worse or better place to
live" (Place to Live), respectively. Heteroscedastic adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses.12
Table 2: Estimates of Europeans’ Attitude toward Immigrants (odd ratios)
Economy Culture Place to Live
Gender 0.828*** 1.061 1.022
(0.0230) (0.0453) (0.0381)
Age 1.005 0.936*** 0.926***
(0.0188) (0.0129) (0.0140)
Education level 1.757*** 1.810*** 1.715***
(0.0722) (0.0784) (0.0702)
Marital status 0.981 0.963 0.926*
(0.0768) (0.0280) (0.0374)
Health status 1.102*** 1.115*** 1.131***
(0.0251) (0.0246) (0.0159)
Income level 1.160*** 1.097*** 1.088***
(0.0300) (0.0259) (0.0196)
Domicile 1.196*** 1.213*** 1.215***
(0.0422) (0.0654) (0.0434)
Employment status 0.833** 0.921* 0.802***
(0.0713) (0.0448) (0.0588)
Religiousness 1.062*** 1.090*** 1.088***
(0.0177) (0.0299) (0.0245)
Political orientation 0.760*** 0.675*** 0.696***
(0.0362) (0.0394) (0.0385)
Immigrant parents 1.628*** 1.533*** 1.719***
(0.136) (0.0764) (0.119)
Trust people 1.303*** 1.222* 1.119
Continued on next page
12To economise on space, we only report here final specifications. We set out by estimating null models, without independent
variables, for all specifications. The null models showed that the variation between countries in attitudes towards immigration was
significant. Then, we proceeded by estimating models without and with interaction terms, and finally what is reported here are the
final (multi-level) models to account for this variation.
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
Economy Culture Place to Live
(0.119) (0.144) (0.105)
Trust legal system 1.540*** 1.484*** 1.559***
(0.0404) (0.0644) (0.0653)
State of health services 1.350*** 1.105 1.257***
(0.0574) (0.0701) (0.0650)
State of education system 1.064** 1.074* 1.116***
(0.0311) (0.0408) (0.0327)
Social interaction 1.010 1.054*** 1.001
(0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0166)
Church attendance 1.168*** 1.088 1.253***
(0.0558) (0.0772) (0.0860)
Worked in political/action group 1.434*** 1.296*** 1.343***
(0.0918) (0.126) (0.0883)
Contacted politician/government 1.093** 1.077** 1.071
(0.0441) (0.0340) (0.0465)
Worn campaign badge/sticker 1.151*** 1.274*** 1.215***
(0.0254) (0.0406) (0.0415)
Taken part in demonstrations 1.255*** 1.262*** 1.214***
(0.0705) (0.0680) (0.0579)
Member of trade union 0.943 0.946 0.988
(0.0510) (0.0421) (0.0364)
Feel safe 1.473*** 1.483*** 1.609***
(0.0613) (0.0802) (0.0682)
Feel fair treated 1.251*** 1.350*** 1.300***
(0.0178) (0.0362) (0.0400)
Victim of burglary/assault 0.921 0.875 0.730
(0.0198) (0.0402) (0.0310)
DHighGDPcap 1.350*** 1.427 1.303
(0.264) (0.409) (0.374)
DHighDebt 0.553* 0.753 0.639
(0.171) (0.192) (0.208)
DHighElderlyPop 0.790 1.121 1.100
(0.132) (0.390) (0.381)
DHighAsylumSeekers 0.431*** 0.556 0.484*
(0.0976) (0.222) (0.191)
DHighForeignStock 0.534*** 0.916 0.774
(0.102) (0.328) (0.261)
DHighNationalityAcq 0.803 0.944 1.150
(0.174) (0.298) (0.341)
DColonial tradition 1.197 0.816 0.654
(0.264) (0.203) (0.225)
DHighGDPcap&HighForeignStock 2.991*** 0.807 0.931
(0.743) (0.319) (0.364)
DHighTrust&HighAsylumSeekers 1.124 1.153 1.284*
(0.0868) (0.161) (0.178)
DHighTrust&HighForeignStock 1.094 1.090 1.381***
(0.0952) (0.139) (0.151)
DHighTrust&HighNationalityAcq 1.036 1.077 0.996
Continued on next page
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Table 2 – Continued from previous page
Economy Culture Place to Live
(0.0718) (0.139) (0.116)
DHighTrust&Unemployment 1.029 1.132** 1.175**
(0.0576) (0.0585) (0.0869)
DHighTrust&LowIncome 1.065** 1.007 1.066*
(0.0303) (0.0400) (0.0362)
Observations 165,173 165,772 165,331
The estimates above are odd ratios. One can read the odd ratios as follows: if the odd ratio, a, is
bigger than one (a > 1), then the probability of an individual to express very positive sentiments toward
immigration (yit=4, i.e., maximum level), increases by (a-1)*100%, whereas the probability decreases by
(1-a)*100%, if the odd ratio is smaller than one (a < 1).
In terms of individual characteristics, the educational level of the individual matters the most. Higher
levels of formal education tend to be associated with positive attitude toward immigration’s effects on
economy (75.7%), culture (81%) and making a country a better place to live (71.5%). Evidence has shown
that more educated individuals are less likely to express prejudice, negative stereotypes and racism to-
wards minorities (Herreros and Criado, 2009). For at least two reasons. First, according to the labour
market competition theory, as immigrants mostly work in low-skilled manual jobs, they are more likely to
be complement rather than substitute to highly educated natives (Bogard and Sherrod, 2008; Hainmueller
and Hiscox, 2010). Second, the link between education and attitudes is deeply rooted in the fact that ed-
ucational systems tend to promote acceptance of different cultural values and beliefs (Hainmueller and
Hiscox, 2007).
The origin of the respondent’s parents (i.e., whether the parents are immigrants, one or both of them)
is also an important contributor to positive sentiments toward immigrants. Respondents who are immi-
grant’s children themselves tend to have a positive stance on immigration’s effect on economy (62.8%),
cultural enrichment (53.3%) and better living (71.9%). It is rather evident that individuals who are raised
by immigrant parent(s) are exposed to different cultures, develop better understanding of these cultures
and, therefore, express less fear toward immigrants (Finney and Peach, 2004; ?; Goldstein and Peters, 2014).
The following set of characteristics: domicile (live in city/town), high income level, good health status
and religiousness of the individual are also positively associated with a friendlier stance toward immigra-
tion. More specifically, residing in a big city/town (compared to living in the countryside), higher income
level, good health status and being religious make an individual about 19.6%, 16%, 10.2% and 6.2% more
prone to be in favour of immigration effects on economy (effects are similar for culture and quality of life).
Individuals who live in a city/town have more job options, exposure to cultural events, enjoy more po-
lice attendance compared to an individual who lives in the countryside; therefore, they can develop less
anti-immigrant sentiments compared to individuals who live away from cities and towns -a finding also
documented in Butkus et al. (2016). Further, high levels of income provide financial security; good health
status makes one feel psychologically better and not being in competition for social security benefits; and
religiousness cultivates positive feelings toward the mankind and promotes treating people equally.
In contrast, gender (being a woman), age (getting older), marital status (being married), employment
status (unemployed) and political (right-wing) orientation of the individual appear to be associated with
anti-immigration attitudes. In particular, women tend to be about 17.2% less favourable to immigration
than men, which lines up with evidence from the literature that women feel more economic threaten from
immigration than men (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), while men seem to be more prone to feelings of
cultural threat (?).
Age appears to have a positive but small and statistically insignificant effect on sentiments toward
immigration’s impact on economy, when all other causes are accounted; a finding consistent with the lit-
erature (Hempstead and Espenshade, 1996; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Theoretical research suggests
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that on economic grounds old individuals should be more open to immigration than younger ones. As-
suming that immigration is predominantly labor migration, immigrants can be considered to be substitutes
to workers and complements to (older) capital owners (Benhabib, 1996; ?). When age exerts significant in-
fluence, it is usually positively correlated to prejudices and anti-immigration attitudes (Burns and Gimpel,
2000; ?). Altogether, older individuals are more likely to support exclusion of out-groups (Gorodzeisky,
2011), which is true for the case of culture and quality of living. Further, to explore whether immigration
concerns increase till retirement and decrease afterward, we include the dummy DHighElderlyPop. In contrast
to some evidence in favour (Calahorrano, 2013), our results do not support this conjecture.
Marital status (being married versus all other alternatives) of the individual plays little role in affecting
attitude as the coefficients are statistically insignificant in all specifications except for the case of quality of
living, where married individual tend to be less immigrant friendly. Perhaps safety issues, especially if the
family has children, could be part of the explanation.
Consistent with rational competition theories, employment status has always been crucial predictor
of attitudes to minorities. Unemployed people and blue collar workers are more likely to express anti-
immigration sentiments and support the restriction of immigration (Herreros and Criado, 2009; ?). Com-
pared to people in paid jobs, jobless individuals are about 16.7% more probable to have a negative stance on
immigration as they feel threaten from increased job competition (Gorodzeisky, 2011). Unemployed people
may also feel a general threat from new comers, due to their situation, which is at "risk", and express this
negativity toward immigrants and their impact on culture and quality of living.
Political ideology, as expected, also associates with stances toward immigration. The literature has
found that left-wing people score higher than conservative people on the index on attitudes toward immi-
gration (?). This also holds in our study. All other things equal, right-wing political oriented individuals
are 24% less likely to consider immigration beneficial for a country’s economy, 32.5% less likely to see how
it adds to culture and 30.4% less prone to accept that immigrants can make a country better (Davis and
Deole, 2015).
Summing up, among the socio-demographic characteristics of the Europeans, it is the high education
level that contributes the most to positive sentiments toward immigrants, whereas political orientation
(right-wing) relates the most to anti-immigrant sentiments. Other characteristics such as domicile (living
in a city/town), good health status, high income level, and being religious appear to show a positive
and statistically significant association with immigration sentiments, while employment status (jobless)
associates with negative attitude.
Next set of estimates analyse the role of social capital. Among its three dimensions (i.e., trust, networks,
and norms & sanctions), it is the trust in people and institutions (legal, health and education), that has
the largest influence in shaping positive sentiments toward immigrants. It has been argued that social
trusters have altruistic preferences (?). Social trust implies an expectation that strangers are trustworthy
and this expectation is extended to all people, including immigrants from different cultural backgrounds.
The "mechanism" that links social trust and positive attitudes toward immigrants is that trusters exclude
heuristics and cues based on racial or cultural stereotypes when forming their beliefs about other people’s
trustworthiness. As our results show, the coefficient related to trust in people is significant and in the
expected direction. Social trust is associated with more positive attitude toward immigrants and their
impact on economy (30.3%), culture (22.2%) and quality of living (11.9%) than social distrust. This result is
also confirmed by the study of Herreros and Criado (2009), which assigns a very important role to social
trust in shaping individuals’ attitude toward immigration. Likewise, institutional trust, especially trust
in legal system, shapes positive attitudes to immigration. Trust in legal system associates with 54% higher
probability of positive attitude to immigrants’ effect on economy (48.4% and 55.9%, respectively, on culture
and quality of living). Satisfaction from the health and education systems also associate with 35% and
6.4%, respectively, more positive sentiments to immigrants’ effect on economy. Institutional trust increases
society’s overall effectiveness (??), make people more confident for the society they live in and the way
the society copes with stressful situations. If immigration is such, then trusters in country’s institutions,
all other variables considered, tend to express more welcoming attitude toward immigrants compared to
institutional distrusters.
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Social networks of informal type, such as meeting with friends, relatives, colleagues, participating in
associations (including churches) and voluntary work (so-called Putnam-type social activities) or formal
type, such as work for political parties, professional organisations or trade unions among others (so-called
Olson-type social activities) are also found to have positive impact on immigration attitude index. In-
dividuals who are socially and, especially, politically active tend to express more positive immigration
sentiments compared to individuals who are not. Among these activities, being member or working for po-
litical parties/action groups, participating in campaigns (wear campaign badge/sticker) and lawful public
demonstrations significantly increases the probability of having a more positive attitude toward immi-
grants. The only exception is the association with trade union. Being a member of a trade union decreases
the probability of having positive attitude to immigrants. In times of ample national supply of labour, trade
unions are likely to oppose recruitment of immigrant workers; while in times of labour shortages, unions
will probably be more willing to cooperate. Furthermore, in times of widespread unemployment, compe-
tition (actual or presumed) between indigenous and immigrant workers might increase, making inclusive
union policies difficult to maintain (?). However, trade union estimates are statistically insignificant.
Conditionally that the engagement in these groups does entail rent seeking or protecting of in-group
interests, such activities increase the "embeddedness" of the individual and develop a strong feeling of
belonging in society and thus enhance trust and cooperation among individuals.
Solid norms and transparent and effective sanctions reduce the incentives for criminal action; individu-
als who feel safe, fair treated, and not being victimised, develop stronger ties within their community and
feel less threaten. Consequently, absence of criminality is highly associated with positive stance toward
immigrants. This conjecture is confirmed by our estimates of feeling safe and fair treated which carry the
expected sign and are statistically significant.
In sum, all dimensions of social capital, and particularly, trustworthiness, greatly contribute to friendly
and welcoming attitude toward immigrants across all specifications.
Macroeconomic conditions do matter as well for public assessments regarding the impact of immigra-
tion. Countries with higher GDP per capita (DHighGDPcap) are 35% more probable to associate with positive
attitude toward immigrants’ effect on economy than countries with lower GDP per capita. The fiscal cost
of immigration also appears to be an important aspect of attitude. Countries with high debt (DHighDebt)
are about 45% more prone to associate with anti-immigration sentiments compared to countries with low
debt. For example, immigrants who do not find employment are a fiscal burden on the welfare state and
thus for natives of all ages. In this case, the design of the welfare system determines whether individuals
with high or low incomes are most affected, as Facchini and Mayda (2009) state. Empirical evidence on
the macroeconomic conditions, however, is mixed, mainly weak and sometimes with perverse results. For
instance, ? find that higher GDP per capita implies significantly more negative attitudes, while ? and ?
support the opposite relation. Other studies (?) find no impact on attitudes. A recent study by Hatton
(2016) documents strong positive and negative effect of GDP per capita and public dept, respectively, on
individuals’ attitude toward immigrants.
The stock of foreigners, i.e., foreign-born people, first and second generation of foreigners/immigrants
in a country, contributes to the multiculturalism profile of a country. Multiculturalism, as the acknowledge-
ment and appreciation of racial and ethnic differences, may stir up both positive and negative reactions:
it can encourage the decrease of prejudice or can increase the perception of threat to national identity (?).
Studies that have tried to reconcile this contradiction found that multiculturalism increases perceptions
of threat mostly among individuals with a strong national identity (??). Our results show that citizens
in countries with many foreigners (DHighForeignStock) and refugees/asylum seekers (DHighAsylumSeekers) are
about 46.6% and 56.9%, respectively, to show anti-immigrant feelings compared to citizens who live in
countries with more ethically homogenous population and less refugees (?). For some people, perhaps,
there can be a threshold beyond which they do not think favourably towards new immigrants. This nega-
tive effect of the size of immigrant (foreign) population is also documented in the literature (??), with some
studies to find no link at all (Rustenbach, 2010). Further refugees presence is associated with negative
sentiments of citizens when it comes to refugees’ impact on the quality of living. The number of national-
ity acquisitions (DHighNationalityAcq), although it appears to negatively associate with attitude, in countries
that have more nationality acquisitions, it has no statistical significance at all. The colonial tradition of the
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country has also no statistical significance.
Nevertheless, the negative impact of multiculturalism and ethnic diversity on immigration attitude
may alter when we consider the level of economic development of the country. The coefficient of the
dummy, DHighGDPcap&HighForeignStock captures exactly this. What we observe is that in countries with high
percentage of foreign population and high GDP per capita sentiments toward immigrants are more posi-
tive, especially when it comes to the economic impact, than in countries with high percentage of foreign
population and low GDP per capita. Wealthier countries have better economic and institutional mecha-
nisms to provide for and integrate different ethnicities/races. Independent of economic conditions, how-
ever, individual’s prejudice may remain against foreigners, and this is indeed the case as the coefficient of
DHighGDPcap&HighForeignStock turns negative in the other two specifications, loosing however, its statistical
significance.
Independent of the economic performance of a country, when we consider country’s trust level, the pic-
ture that emerges sharply contradicts with the xenophobic one presented above. In countries that host big
numbers of foreigners or asylum seekers and are rich in social trust, the sentiments toward immigrants tend
to be more xenophile than in countries with low social trust. The coefficient of DHigh Trust&HighForeignStock
captures exactly this positive effect -bigger than one in all specifications and statistically significant in the
last one. This is because rich in social capital countries are more cooperative and egalitarian (Hayashi et al.,
1999; ?; Bowles and Gintis, 2002) and therefore able to cope effectively with accommodating new com-
ers. Social trusters are also 28.4% (DHighTrust&HighAsylumSeekers) more prone to have a positive stance on the
impact of asylum seekers on culture.
Finally, we revisit the individual characteristics, and particular the ones that relate to the "threat effect",
i.e., when an individual is at a "risky" situation and therefore feels threat from new comers. This time, how-
ever, we consider how different is a social truster individual who is unemployed (DHighTrust&Unemployment)
or a social truster individual who has very low income level (DHighTrust&LowIncome) from equal peers who
are social distrusters. Again, in this case results alter dramatically. Unemployed trusters are not negative
at all to immigrants than unemployed distrusters. In fact, they are 13.2% and 17.5% more probable to have
positive attitude on the immigrants’ impact on culture and quality of living, respectively. Likewise, low
income social trusters are about 6.5% more positive to immigrants than low income distrusters.
Overall, our empirical analysis has shown that social capital has a positive impact on attitudes toward
immigration via two effects, a direct effect: rich in social capital countries have more positive attitude
toward immigration than countries which are not, and an indirect effect: social capital and particularly
social trust moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people’s opinions about immigrants.
Individuals with low income, or unemployed people or citizens in multicultural and ethnically diverse
environments, where the risk of inter-group conflicts is high, will nonetheless exhibit generally positive
attitudes toward immigration if they are social trusters.
4.2. Do Europeans’ Sentiments Vary Across Different Immigrant Profiles?
In this section, we turn our attention into examining whether sentiments toward immigrants differ
depending on immigrant’s profile, i.e., race/ethnicity and country of origin. Different attitude toward
different types of immigrants reveals the concerns of the Europeans toward certain cultures, and it is an
indication of individuals perception toward the immigration policy (stricter or looser toward certain im-
migrant profiles) their country should apply.
Table 3 shows the results. Columns (i) to (iii) report the odd ratios of equation (1) on the respon-
dent’s attitudes toward "allow many/few immigrants of same race /ethnic group as majority" (Same Race),
"allow many/few immigrants of different race /ethnic group from majority" (Di f f erent Race), and "al-
low many/few immigrants from poorer non-European countries" (Poorer/NonEU), respectively. Het-
eroscedastic adjusted standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 3: Estimates of Europeans’ Attitude toward Different Immigrant Types (odd ratios)
Same Race Di f f erent Race Poorer/NonEU
Gender 0.970* 1.000 1.047
(0.0156) (0.0274) (0.0251)
Age 0.947* 0.895*** 0.877***
(0.0266) (0.0214) (0.0172)
Education level 1.690*** 1.771*** 1.596***
(0.0655) (0.0643) (0.0463)
Marital status 0.831*** 0.850** 0.934
(0.0574) (0.0547) (0.0642)
Health status 1.135*** 1.125*** 1.087***
(0.0186) (0.0149) (0.0175)
Income level 1.177*** 1.133*** 1.105***
(0.0268) (0.0225) (0.0215)
Domicile 1.153*** 1.143*** 1.114***
(0.0435) (0.0398) (0.0377)
Employment status 0.868* 0.823** 0.883
(0.0685) (0.0637) (0.103)
Religiousness 1.055 1.029 1.073**
(0.0371) (0.0344) (0.0373)
Political orientation 0.751*** 0.669*** 0.666***
(0.0279) (0.0328) (0.0323)
Immigrant parents 1.338*** 1.326*** 1.284***
(0.0574) (0.0739) (0.0644)
Trust people 1.105* 1.101* 1.076
(0.147) (0.141) (0.151)
Trust legal system 1.257*** 1.317*** 1.262***
(0.0531) (0.0579) (0.0531)
State of health services 1.107* 1.094 1.079*
(0.0648) (0.0611) (0.0471)
State of education system 0.982 0.973 0.954
(0.0366) (0.0351) (0.0379)
Social interaction 1.022 1.005 1.034
(0.0243) (0.0300) (0.0334)
Church attendance 1.180*** 1.263*** 1.337***
(0.0690) (0.0889) (0.0965)
Worked in political/action group 1.244*** 1.283*** 1.299***
(0.0545) (0.0977) (0.0783)
Contacted politician/government 1.116*** 1.123** 1.071*
(0.0423) (0.0515) (0.0401)
Worn campaign badge/sticker 1.237*** 1.277*** 1.256***
(0.0252) (0.0478) (0.0365)
Taken part in demonstrations 1.187*** 1.131*** 1.126***
(0.0465) (0.0858) (0.0811)
Member of trade union 0.979 0.992 0.991
(0.0364) (0.0385) (0.0417)
Feel safe 1.298*** 1.391*** 1.336***
(0.0538) (0.0437) (0.0299)
Feel fair treated 1.224*** 1.193*** 1.157***
(0.0330) (0.0294) (0.0215)
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – Continued from previous page
Same Race Di f f erent Race Poorer/NonEU
Victim of burglary/assault 0.950 0.897 0.789
(0.0374) (0.0398) (0.0333)
DHighGDPcap 1.365* 1.264 1.301
(0.455) (0.465) (0.523)
DHighDebt 0.759* 0.568 0.619
(0.214) (0.234) (0.288)
DHighAsylumSeekers 0.757 0.442* 0.430*
(0.323) (0.195) (0.209)
DHighForeignStock 0.674 0.683 0.678
(0.315) (0.246) (0.271)
DHighNationalityAcq 1.041 1.050 1.061
(0.212) (0.403) (0.419)
DColonial tradition 0.999 1.517 1.456
(0.466) (0.753) (0.784)
DHigh ElderlyPop 1.168 1.169 1.049
(0.342) (0.503) (0.499)
DHighGDPcap&HighForeignPop 1.167* 2.049 2.312
(0.516) (1.014) (1.300)
DHigh Trust&HighAsylumSeekers 1.239* 1.303** 1.257**
(0.148) (0.137) (0.147)
DHigh Trust&HighForeignPop 1.278* 1.270* 1.221
(0.169) (0.160) (0.169)
DHigh Trust&HighNationalityAcq 0.933 0.969 1.019
(0.102) (0.0953) (0.110)
DHigh Trust&unemployment 1.000 1.099** 1.070
(0.0649) (0.0485) (0.0773)
DHigh Trust&Low Income 1.092* 1.076** 1.062***
(0.0544) (0.0376) (0.0247)
Observations 165,779 165,772 165,573
All variables that were important in the previous analysis remain important in the present analysis as
well, carrying the expected sign; however, in some cases, their impact changes across different immigrant
profiles.
Among the sociodemographic characteristics of the Europeans, high level of education, having immi-
grant parents, domicile (living in a city/town), good health status, high income level, and being religious,
still pertain their statistical significance and contribute to a positive stance toward immigrants; however,
the xenophile attitude slightly decreases, in some cases, across different immigrant profiles: starts with very
positive stance to immigrants of the same race/ethnicity, becomes less positive to immigrants of different
race/ethnicity and decreases even further to immigrants from poorer non-European countries. There are
two notable exceptions, though. First, higher educated individuals do welcome all immigrants, but they
are even more receptive to immigrants from different racial/ethnic background. This finding further vali-
dates the conjecture that educational systems promote and celebrate acceptance of different cultural values
and beliefs (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007). Second, religious individuals are prone to be more positive
to all immigrant profiles, especially to the poor non-European immigrants. We assume that it is the hu-
manitarian attitude that makes citizens, who can afford to help and citizens who believe in helping others,
to have a more sympathetic attitude. Women, married, unemployed, right-wing politically oriented and
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older individuals appear to express more exclusionary reactions to all immigrants; these reactions become
even more negative to immigrants from different race/ethnicity and especially to those from poorer non-
European countries.
Further, all three dimensions of social capital continue to greatly contribute to the xenophile attitude of
the individuals. Our results show that countries rich in social capital do not actually differentiate across
different types of individuals; this is indeed the essence of social capital: the enhancement of solidarity and
effective cooperation among members of a society embracing everybody, native or immigrant.
Macroeconomic conditions affect individuals’ sentiments toward immigrants, as discussed before, but
we find no statistical difference between high and low GDP per capita (or Debt) countries when it comes
to their attitude toward different immigrant profiles. Societies with more elder citizens tend to be more
in favour of immigrants of the same race/ethnicity compared to the rest, but results have no statistical
significance.
In multicultural countries -identified by large stock of foreign people, asylum seekers, nationality acqui-
sitions and colonial tradition- there is more of a perceived group threat, leading to more antipathy toward
the out-group -especially in the case of asylum seekers (DHighAsylumSeekers), which is the only statistical sig-
nificant coefficient. In wealthier countries, however, multiculturalism does not pose necessarily a threat as
the coefficient of the dummy DHighGDPcap&HighForeigners indicates. As inter-group resource competition is
less fierce, citizens’ attitudes are friendlier to all types of immigrants than in a less wealthy multicultural
country.
The picture alters entirely when we consider social trust and intersect it with multiculturalism (for
instance, DHigh Trust&HighForeignPop): In societies with high social trust and strong multicultural background,
immigrants of all types are welcome; slightly more are those from the same race/ethnicity. Perhaps, the
integration of these immigrants poses less strain to the economy and culture of the host country.
Finally, unemployed trusters do not actually differentiate among immigrants. Same holds for low in-
come social trusters.
Overall, a consistent finding that emerges is that public attitude toward immigrants appears to vary
across different immigrant profiles. Europeans are slightly more xenophile to immigrants of the same
race/ethnicity. Strong presence of social capital only improves xenophobic attitudes and differentiation
across immigrant profiles.
Robustness
We have performed several checks to sharpen the robustness of our results. We split our sample in two
sub-periods and estimate attitudes for the periods, 2002-2008 and 2010-2014, in order to examine whether
attitudes have changed over time, and especially after the financial crisis (2008) and the Syrian Exodus
(2013). Results did not alter significantly.
Further, in all interaction terms we replaced social trust with trust in institutions.13 Results mildly
varied without, however, showing any significant change.
We also examined whether the geographic location of the respondents matters. We classified our coun-
tries into various groups, for instance, North and South and estimated equation (1) for each group. Results
remained unaltered.
Finally, we also included various (mainly macroeconomic) control variables in the Z set. Results barely
modified.
Overall, results do not change in any significant way across different specifications, sub-samples and
alternative definitions.14
5. Conclusion
Substantially increasing international migration flows over the past several decades have fundamen-
tally changed the composition of the European countries’ populations and brought immigration to the
13Using principal component analysis, we constructed an index of institutional satisfaction/trust.
14All sensitivity analysis results are available upon request.
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front of the research and policy agenda. The question of how public opinion toward immigration is formed
has become as relevant as ever with implications for both present and potential immigrants as well as for
policymakers to meet the challenges associated with increased immigration.
Using the most recent version of the European Study Survey, a large cross-national European popula-
tion survey, this paper studies the attitudes toward immigrants and the contextual factors that shape these
attitudes in Europe. Based on detailed information on 267,282 respondents over the period 2002-2014, we
find that despite the eventful past years, Europeans, on average, are still positive toward immigrants, with
the North European countries to exhibit the least xenophobic attitudes. Among personal characteristics of
the individual, the level of education shapes xenophile sentiments, while right-wing political orientation
leads to xenophobic stance. Macroeconomic conditions as well as ethnic diversity do play an important role
in shaping attitudes. A salient finding of our analysis is that regardless of the impact of other contextual
factors, individuals (and countries) with high social capital do exhibit more positive attitudes toward all
immigrants -independently of their background- than the rest of the population (countries). Furthermore,
social capital moderates the negative effects of "perceived threat" on people’s opinions about immigrants.
Our findings corroborate with the important role the literature has assigned to social capital in increas-
ing efficiency and growth by facilitating collaboration between individual conflicting interests towards the
achievement of increased output and equitable distribution (?Hall, 1999).
The implication of our results is straightforward. In increasingly multicultural societies, social capital
makes people more receptive to immigration. A successful public policy, therefore, can reduce inter-group
social tensions and increase social cohesion by investing more in social capital.
An issue for further exploration that has largely been overlooked is how survey respondents under-
stand the term "immigrant". The public perceptions of immigration may largely diverge from the set of in-
dividuals identified as immigrants in government statistics; Blinder (2013) has shown that this was exactly
the case in the UK. Such perceptions, however, could mistakenly lead to negative stances toward immigra-
tion and politicians and policy makers, taking into considerations such attitudes, can form restrictive immi-
gration policies that would impede the knowledge (for instance, international students/academicians/researchers)
mobility and cultural exchange across countries having negative implications for an economy’s innovation
and growth prospects.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Number of Observations (obs) by Country and Wave
European Study Survey (ESS)Waves
Country Country 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014
Code (obs) (obs) (obs) (obs) (obs) (obs) (obs)
Austria AUT 2,257 2,256 2,405 - - - 1,795
Belgium BEL 1,899 1,778 1,798 1,760 1,704 1,869 1,769
Switzerland CHE 2,040 2,141 1,804 1,819 1,506 1,493 1,532
Czech Republic CZE 1,360 3,026 - 2,018 2,386 2,009 2,148
Germany DEU 2,919 2,870 2,916 2,751 3,031 2,958 3,045
Denmark DNK 1,506 1,487 1,505 1,610 1,576 1,650 1,502
Estonia EST - 1,989 1,517 1,661 1,793 2,380 2,051
Spain ESP 1,729 1,663 1,876 2,576 1,885 1,889 1,925
Finland FIN 2,000 2,022 1,896 2,195 1,878 2,197 2,087
France FRA 1,503 1,806 1,986 2,073 1,728 1,968 1,917
United Kingdom GBR 2,052 1,897 2,394 2,352 2,422 2,286 2,264
Greece GRC 2,566 2,406 - 2,072 2,715 - -
Hungary HUN 1,685 1,498 1,518 1,544 1,561 2,014 1,698
Ireland IRL 2,046 2,286 1,800 1,764 2,576 2,628 2,390
Italy ITA 1,207 - - - - 960 -
Netherlands NLD 2,364 1,881 1,889 1,778 1,829 1,845 1,919
Norway NOR 2,036 1,760 1,750 1,549 1,548 1,624 1,436
Poland POL 2,110 1,716 1,721 1,619 1,751 1,898 1,615
Portugal PRT 1,511 2,052 2,222 2,367 2,150 2,151 1,265
Sweden SWE 1,999 1,948 1,927 1,830 1,497 1,847 1,791
Slovenia SVN 1,519 1,442 1,476 1,286 1,403 1,257 1,224
Slovakia SVK - 1,512 1,766 1,810 1,856 1,847 -
Total 38,308 41,436 36,166 38,434 38,795 38,770 35,373
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Table A.2: Variables and Sources
Variable Description
Dependent (y)
Economy Immigration is bad or good for country’s economy
Culture Country’s cultural life undermined/enriched by immigrants
Place to Live Immigrants make country worse/better place to live
Same Race Allow immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority
Different Race Allow immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority
Poorer/NonEU Allow immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe
Socio-demographic
Gender Gender of the respondent
Age Age of the respondent, calculated
Education level Highest level of respondent’s education
Marital status Legal marital status of respondent
Health status Subjective general health
Income level Household’s total net income
Domicile Domicile, respondent’s description
Employment status Main activity, last 7 days
Religiousness How religious are you
Political orientation Placement on left right scale
Immigrant parents mother/father are immigrants
Social Capital
Trust people Most people can be trusted or you can’t be too careful
Trust legal system Trust in the legal system
State of health services State of health services in country
State of education system State of education in country
Social interaction How often meet friends/relatives/colleagues
Church attendance How often attend religious services
Worked in political/action group Worked in political party or action group
Contacted politician/government Contacted politician/government official
Worn campaign badge/sticker Worn or displayed campaign badge/sticker
Take part in demonstrations Taken part in lawful public demonstration
Member of trade union Member of trade union/organisation
Feel safe Feeling of safety of walking alone in local area
Feel fair treated People take advantage of you/Treat you fair
Victim of burglary/assault Victim of burglary/assault last 5 years
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
Variable ESS code Our code
Dependent (y)
Economy 0=Bad for economy,..., 10=Good for economy 1=Very bad,..., 4=Very good
Culture 0=Cultural life undermined,..., 10=Cultural life enriched 1=Very undermined,..., 4=Very enriched
Place to Live 0=Worse place to live,...,10=Better place to live 1=Much worse,..., 4=Much better
Same Race Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None 1=None,..., 4=Many
Different Race Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None 1=None,..., 4=Many
Poorer/NonEU Allow: 1=Many, 2=Some, 3=A few, 4=None 1=None,..., 4=Many
Socio-demographic
Gender 1=Male, 2=Female 0=Male, 1=Female
Age 13-123 years old 1=<24, 2=25-34, 3=35-44,..., 6=>65
Education level 0=Unclassified into 5-level,..., 5=Tertiary 1=< Primary, 2=Primary/Secondary, 3=Tertiary
Marital status 1=Married,..., 6=Never married 0=Non-married, 1=Married
Health status 1=Very good, 2=Good, 3=Fair, 4=Bad, 5=Very bad 1=Bad, 2=Fair, 3=Good
Income level J=1st decile,..., H=10th decile 1=Low, 2=Medium, 3=High
Domicile 1=A big city,..., 5=Countryside 1=Countryside, 2=City/Town
Employment status 1=Paid work,..., 8=Housework 0=Unemployed, 1=Employed
Religiousness 0=Not at all religious,..., 10=Very religious 1=Not at all, 2=Moderate, 3=Very
Political orientation 0=Left,..., 10=Right 1=Left, 2=Middle, 3=Right
Immigrant parents (Constructed) 0=No, 1=Yes
Social Capital
Trust people 0=Not trusted,..., 10=Most people trusted 0=No trust, 1=Trust
Trust legal system 0=No trust at all,..., 10=Complete trust 0=No trust, 1=Trust
State of health services 0=Extremely bad,..., 10=Extremely good 0=Unsatisfied, 1=Satisfied
State of education system 0=Extremely bad,..., 10=Extremely good 0=Unsatisfied, 1=Satisfied
Social interaction 1=Never,..., 7=Every day 0=Not very often, 1=Very often
Church attendance 1=Every day,..., 7=Never 0=Rarely, 1=Often
Worked in political/action group 1=Yes, 2=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Contacted politician/government 1=Yes, 2=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Worn campaign badge/sticker 1=Yes, 2=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Take part in demonstrations 1=Yes, 2=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Member of trade union 1=Yes, currently, 2=Yes, previously, 3=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Feel safe 1=Very safe,..., 4=Very unsafe 0=No, 1=Yes
Feel fair treated 0=People take advantage of you,..., 10=People treat you fair 0=Unfair, 1=Fair
Victim of burglary/assault 1=Yes, 2=No 0=No, 1=Yes
Note: All variables are extracted from the European Study Survey (ESS)
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Figure A.1: Sentiments toward Immigration’s Impact on (a) Economy (b) Culture, and (c) Place to Live.
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Figure A.2: Sentiments toward Immigration Policy for (a) Same Race/Ethnicity, (b) Different Race/Ethnicity, and (c) Poorer non-
European Immigrants.
29
Table A.3: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
(y variables)
Economy 256,331 2.591 0.935 1 4
Culture 256,850 2.561 1.071 1 4
Place to live 256,441 2.614 0.892 1 4
Same Race 259,601 2.778 0.849 1 4
Different Race 259,392 2.507 0.872 1 4
Poorer/Non EU 258,859 2.437 0.890 1 4
(x variables)
-Sociodemographic
Gender 267,005 0.532 0.499 0 1
Age 267,282 3.754 1.694 1 6
Education level 265,758 2.279 0.466 1 3
Marital status 267,282 0.298 0.457 0 1
Health status 266,995 2.584 0.635 1 3
Income level 199,430 1.845 0.736 1 3
Domicile 266,503 1.625 0.484 1 2
Employment status 267,282 0.055 0.227 0 1
Religiousness 265,197 1.945 0.819 1 3
Political orientation 235,269 1.924 0.750 1 3
Immigrant parents 266,854 0.144 0.352 0 1
-Social Capital
Trust people 266,438 0.644 0.479 0 1
Trust legal system 260,985 0.640 0.480 0 1
State of health services 263,854 0.649 0.477 0 1
State of education system 254,428 0.552 0.497 0 1
Social interaction 266,668 0.623 0.485 0 1
Church attendance 266,088 0.256 0.436 0 1
Worked in political/action group 266,492 0.040 0.196 0 1
Contacted politician/government 266,424 0.147 0.354 0 1
Worn campaign badge/sticker 266,294 0.077 0.267 0 1
Take part in demonstrations 266,388 0.066 0.248 0 1
Member of trade union 263,952 0.424 0.494 0 1
Feel safe 264,863 0.776 0.417 0 1
Feel fair treated 265,389 0.537 0.499 0 1
Victim of burglary/assault 266,551 0.188 0.390 0 1
-Macroeconomic
GDP per capita (constant 2011, PPP) 267,282 38,801 18,877 8,815 90,807
Debt (%GDP) 267,282 57.67 28.51 4.400 146.2
Elderly population (% population) 267,282 18.47 2.071 12.84 21.76
-Foreign
Asylum seekers (% population) 267,282 0.101 0.120 0.0005 0.774
Stock of foreigners (% population) 267,282 6.623 4.784 0.0164 23.78
Nationality acquisition (% population) 267,282 0.189 0.148 0.0026 0.624
Colonial tradition 267,282 0.39 0.488 0 1
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